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There Has Been a MisConcepcion:
The FAA Does Not Foster the Waiver
of Statutory Rights
Reyes v. Liberman Broad, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the ongoing dispute between Jesus Reyes and Liberman Broadcasting, Inc.,
the state courts in California must decide when and how employers can compel
employees to arbitrate employment claims. This decision is made increasingly
challenging by the existence of an ever-changing legal backdrop that has become
progressively more employer-friendly. However, California courts must render a
decision that does not infringe on employees' statutory bargaining rights. Reyes is
currently pending review based on the holding in another case, Iskanian v. CLS
Transp. Los Angeles, LLC 2. The issue on review in both cases concerns the ap-
plicability of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to class arbitration waivers in the
employment contract context.
This paper first discusses the particular facts and proceedings in Reyes. Next,
it will discuss the complicated legal landscape that affects the interpretation of
class arbitration waivers in California. Then, this paper will analyze the California
Court of Appeals' rationale for its holding in Reyes. Next, this paper will construct
an argument in favor of allowing employees to maintain bargaining rights in some
circumstances, despite the existence of a class arbitration waiver in an employ-
ment contract. Finally, this paper will explore outside factors that may affect the
Supreme Court of California's ability to render a decision and analyze how the
court's reasoning could leave its own impact on the current legal landscape in
California.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Jesus Reyes began working as a security officer for Liberman Broadcasting,
Inc. (LBI) on April 24, 2009.3 Reyes remained employed at LBI until September
of that year. 4 In 2010, Reyes filed a class complaint claiming LBI committed
wage and hour violations.5
On April 8, 2009, prior to commencing his employment with LBI, Reyes
signed an arbitration agreement (Agreement) with LBI. 6 The Agreement express-
ly stated that it was governed by the FAA, 7 and required that all employment dis-
1. Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616 (2012).
2. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 286 P.3d 147 (Cal. 2012).
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putes between LBI and Reyes be resolved through final and binding arbitration.8
The Agreement was silent as to the availability of class arbitration and a purely
textual reading of the Agreement suggested that only bilateral arbitrations were
considered when it was drafted.9 The Agreement permitted discovery by both
parties so that each side could sufficiently arbitrate the claim.10 However, the
Agreement also allowed the "arbitrator to impose... appropriate limits on discov-
ery."" After Reyes acknowledged with his signature that he could read the
Agreement in both English and Spanish, the Agreement was executed.12
On May 27, 2010, Reyes filed a class complaint against LBI alleging several
wage and hour violations.' 3 Reyes later added a representative claim in accord-
ance with the Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA).14 LBI answered the
amended complaint by asserting twenty-two affirmative defenses,' 5 yet, LBI did
not assert the existence of the Agreement among them.16
Reyes sent a request for discovery to LBI,' 7 which led LBI to depose Reyes.
LBI also raised objections to all of Reyes's discovery requests.19 The parties had
a meeting where LBI agreed to provide some class-wide discovery as well as
some statistically representative samples of particular requested information. 20
The parties jointly agreed to conduct a class-wide mediation scheduled to occur on
July 1, 2011.
In October and December of 2010, the trial court held two status confer-
ences.22 In March of 2011, the trial court extended the deadline for class certifica-
tion based on a stipulation between the parties.23 In July of 2011, the time of the
scheduled class-wide mediation, LBI informed Reyes that the company intended
to move to compel arbitration instead, which it did three days later.24 The trial
court denied LBI's motion on the ground that LBI had waived its right to compel
arbitration based on its "failure to properly and timely assert" that right.25 LBI
subsequently appealed.26
8. Id. The contract stated that LBI and Reyes must "agree to submit to final and binding arbitration
all claims, disputes and controversies arising out of, relating to or in any way associated with" an
employee's employment or termination. "Specific claims identified in the Arbitration Agreement
include wage claims, unfair competition claims, and claims for violation of federal, state, local, or
other government law." Id.
9. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619. The language of the Arbitration Agreement specifically states,







15. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619.
16. Id.
17. Id. Request was made on August 5, 2010. Id
18. Id. LBI began depositions on September 1, 2010. Id.
19. Id Objections were raised on October 11, 2010. Id
20. Id.
21. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 619.
22. Id. at 620.
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The California Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision denying
LBI's motion to compel arbitration and awarded costs to LBI. 2 7 The Court of
Appeals set out a two-prong argument defending its holding. First, the court stated
that LBI had not waived its right to compel arbitration. 2 8 Second, the court con-
cluded that the enforcement of the Agreement was not barred by the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), since the NLRA did not apply to the dispute.29 On
December 12, 2012, the Supreme Court of California granted review of this case
and wrote a superseding opinion challenging the trial court's rationale. 30
Reyes first alleged that LBI waived its right to compel arbitration. 31 Pending
review of Iskanian, Reyes also filed petitions alleging that the futility defense
should not be available to LBI to excuse its delay when there was not actually a
change in law but rather only an increased likelihood that the defendant would
succeed.32 Reyes further stipulated that California case law had yet to determine
the extent of an employee's right to resist individual arbitration in order to vindi-
cate his statutory rights. In response, LBI contended that it did not waive its right
to compel arbitration because it could not do so until the United States Supreme
Court rendered a decision in Concepcion.34 LBI further argued that Gentry, a case
Reyes's argument relied on, is no longer good law and even if it were, Reyes did
not provide sufficient evidence to support a claim under the case. 35
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Public policy in the state of California carries a strong presumption in favor
of settling disputes by arbitration rather than litigation.36 However, a party has no
obligation to arbitrate unless he or she expressly consents in a valid and enforcea-
ble written contract to do so.37 Although federal and state law alike favor arbitra-
tion as an efficient and fairly cost-effective means of dispute resolution, a court
may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement based on contract principles or
other laws.38 Yet, as a general practice, courts usually find an intention between
the parties to uphold arbitration clauses.39
California state law concerning arbitration agreements has been affected by
two landmark United States Supreme Court cases: Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal-
Feeds Int'l Corp40 and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.4 1 Stolt-Nielsen held
27. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 635.
28. Id. at 620
29. Id. at 633.
30. Reyes v. Liberman Broad., 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. 2012). Note that on September 27, 2012, Reyes
was denied a rehearing. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, reh'g denied, 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. 2012).
31. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 10, Reyes, 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. 2012) (No. S205907), 2012 WL
5508461, at *1O.
32. Id. at *15. See discussion of the futility doctrine, infra note 129.
33. Id.
34. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr.3d at 625.
35. Id.
36. WILLIAM LINDSLEY, ALYS MASEK & KIMBERLLY C. SIMMONs, 6 CAL. JUR. 3D Arbitration and




40. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
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that "a party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration
unless there is a contractual basis for concluding the party agreed to do so.",42
Concepcion held that the FAA preempts California the doctrine of unconsciona-
bility.43 These holdings, their relationship to California state law cases, and the
statutory rights implicated by these decisions will be discussed below.
A. Waiver by Inaction to Compel Right to Arbitration
California law recognizes a statutory exception to the presumption in favor of
arbitration where the moving party has waived his or her right to compel arbitra-
tion." However, as case law suggests, this is a difficult claim for the plaintiff to
prevail on in light of changing precedent. In determining whether a party has
waived its right to arbitration under California law, a court should consider the
following factors:
(1) whether the party's actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate;
(2) whether the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked and the
parties were well into preparation of a lawsuit before the party notified the oppos-
ing party of an intent to arbitrate;
(3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial
date or delayed for a long period before seeking a stay;
(4) whether a defendant seeking arbitration filed a counterclaim without ask-
ing for a stay of the proceedings;
(5) whether important intervening steps have taken place, and
(6) whether the delay affected, misled, or prejudiced the opposing party. 4 5
In Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc.,46 the Ninth Circuit rendered a decision
that made it virtually impossible for a plaintiff to successfully argue that a defend-
ant waived its right to compel arbitration through inaction.47 In that case, the Fish-
ers brought a lawsuit against a stock brokerage firm alleging that the firm lost over
$2 million of the Fisher's savings through the mismanagement of their accounts.48
The Fishers did not seek arbitration of their claims, as required by arbitration
clause in the agreement they signed, but rather filed a claim in district court alleg-
ing violations of certain federal securities laws.49 The defendant did not move to
compel arbitration because, given that state law followed the intertwining doc-
trine, 5 0 it was likely that the gesture would have been futile.5 ' However, after the
41. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
42. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684.
43. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750-51.
44. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 2012).
45. Grabowski v. Robinson, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1159, 1166 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (applying California state
law).
46. Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d 691 (1986).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 693.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 695. The intertwining doctrine was a prior rule adopted by the Ninth Circuit that found that
"when arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction, and are sufficiently inter-
twined factually and legally, the district court should deny arbitration as to the arbitrable claims in
order to protect the jurisdiction of the federal court and avoid any possible preclusive effect." Id.
51. Id. at 693.
470 [Vol. 2013
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case was filed, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision that over-
ruled the intertwining doctrine.52
The Fisher court examined the three-and-a-half year delay "in light of the
strong federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.""3 The
court rationalized that before the intertwining doctrine was overruled, the arbitra-
tion agreement was unenforceable. 54 Therefore, because the defendant filed its
motion to compel arbitration after United States Supreme Court overruled the
intertwining doctrine, the defendant did not act "inconsistently with a known ex-
isting right to compel arbitration., 5 5 The court further held that the time, money
and effort the Fishers put forth to prepare for trial were not sufficient to prove that
they were prejudiced by the three-and-a-half year lapse in time. 56
B. Statutory Rights and Class Action Waivers
Two federal statutes mentioned in the Reyes case are frequently analyzed in
the employment contract context. The first statute is the FAA, which states that a
written agreement to submit a controversy arising out of the agreement to arbitra-
tion is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, "save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract."57 California adopted is own state
law version of the FAA which requires that a written arbitration agreement shall
be enforced unless a court determines that the petitioner has waived the right to
arbitration, there are grounds to revoke the arbitration agreement, or a party to the
agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a
third party, arising out of the same or a related transaction and there is a possibil-
ity that the two court rulings will conflict.58 The United States Supreme Court has
made it clear that the FAA's "savings clause" does not protect state laws that dis-
criminate against written arbitration agreements and state statutes must be applied
in accordance with the Congressional intent of enacting the FAA.59
The second statute is the NLRA, which was enacted in 1935.60 The NLRA
created the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and serves two important
functions in employment law.6 ' First, the NLRA guarantees employees the right
to organize, work with labor organizations, bargain collectively through represen-
tation, and "engage in activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection." 62 Second, the NLRA makes certain employer conduct
unlawful as an unfair labor practice. Additionally, the NLRB interprets the
NLRA to mean that employees bringing class-wide employment-related claims
52. Fisher v. A. G. Becker Paribas Inc., 791 F.2d at 697.
53. Id. at 693.
54. Id. at 697.
55. Id.
56. Id
57. 9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2006).
58. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1281.2 (West 2012).
59. JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:14 (9th ed. 2012).
60. CAL. PRAC. GUIDE EMP. LITIG. Ch. 15-C.
61. Id
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are exercising rights protected by Section 7 of the NLRA.64 The Ninth Circuit has
held that, under Fair Labor Standards Act and California's Labor Code, employ-
ment rights were analogous to "substantive statutory rights established for a public
reason" and employer-enforced dispute resolution was unenforceable "to the ex-
tent that it barred claims for public injunctive relief."65
In at least one instance, the Second Circuit has ruled that a class action waiver
violates federal substantive arbitration law if enforcing the waiver would prevent
plaintiffs from vindicating their federal statutory rights.66 In In re American Ex-
press Merchants' Litigation , the court considered whether a class action waiver
was enforceable when the original agreement was alleged to be an illegal "tying
agreement" enforced by a credit card company in violation of the Sherman Act.68
The court determined that while class action waivers are not per se unenforceable
in the antitrust context, the economic evidence before the court suggested that
plaintiffs would not be able to vindicate their statutory antitrust rights if they were
unable to able to pursue their claims as a class.69 The following pages will segue
from a broad discussion of these statutory rights to an analysis of the ways in
which these rights are applied in cases concerning class action waivers.
C. Class Action Waivers and the Concepcion Case
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court,70 the Supreme Court of California ren-
dered a landmark decision that declared a class arbitration waiver in a consumer
adhesion contract unconscionable. 7' In Discover Bank, the court reasoned that not
all class action waivers were necessarily unconscionable, but the presence of cer-
tain unsavory factors72 would suggest that a class action waiver was illegal under
California law.73 In that case, it was alleged by credit card holders that Discover
Bank had a fraudulent practice of charging consumers small late payment fees
before the payment was technically considered late under the contract. 74 The court
stated that a class action waiver would be unconscionable in a consumer contract
of adhesion under a circumstance that involved a dispute between contracting
parties involving little damages, where it is alleged the party with superior bar-
64. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184, 2012 WL 12-CA-25764, at *3 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3,
2012).
65. Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass'n, No. 09-16703, 2013 WL 1458876, at *4 (9th Cir. Apr. 11,
2013).
66. In re Am. Exp. Merchants' Litig., 634 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011).
67. Id
68. Id. at 199.
69. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 59.
70. Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76 (2005).
71. Id. at 87.
72. Id. The court explained that waivers become unconscionable
[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,
and when it is alleged that the party with superior bargaining power has carried out a
scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums




74. Id. at 77.
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gaining power intentionally cheated many consumers out of individually small
sums of money.75 In that particular situation, the court found that California would
be free to apply its own state unconscionability standard in favor of the consum-
TS76ers. 7
After Discover Bank, the Supreme Court of California rendered a decision in
Gentry v. Superior Court77 that was believed to have expanded the Discover Bank
holding to include employment contracts. There, Gentry filed a class action law-
suit against Circuit City alleging the company committed overtime violations. 79
Circuit City moved to compel individual arbitration in compliance with the class
arbitration waiver contained in Circuit City's "Dispute Resolution Rules and Pro-
cedures" manual.80 The court determined that "at least in some cases, the prohibi-
tion of class-wide relief would undermine the vindication of the employee's un-
waivable statutory rights" and may pose a considerable obstacle to the state's
enforcement of overtime laws.8 1
The Gentry court considered four factors that favored class actions for alleged
wage-and-hour violation allegations in the employment context.82 First, the court
concluded that wage-and-hour violation allegations tended to be individually
modest. The court rationalized that class actions played an important function in
enforcing state overtime statutes by permitting similarly situated employees who
were subjected to the same unlawful employment practices a "relatively inexpen-
sive way" to bring their case. 84 Second, the court determined that a current em-
ployee who sued his employer without the insulation of a class complaint would
be at a greater risk of retaliation.85 Third, the court noted that some employees
may not bring an individual claim against their employer because they were una-
ware that the employer's actions violated the employee's rights.86 Fourth, the
court looked at other practical obstacles that may prevent some class members
from receiving complete vindication of their rights through individual arbitration,
such as lack of access to an attorney or the transient nature of the employee's
work. The court concluded that, in determining whether a class arbitration waiv-
er was proper in a given situation, a trial court should render a decision in light of
these four factors to determine if a class arbitration would be a "significantly more
effective practical means of vindicating" the employees' rights.88
The entire pro-plaintiff landscape set by the Supreme Court of California was
ruptured by the United States Supreme Court's decision in AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion." In Concepcion, the Court expressly overruled the Discover Bank
75. Id. at 87.
76. Discover Bank, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 87.
77. Gentry v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 4th 443, 453 (2007).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 451.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 450.
82. Id. at 457-463.
83. Gentry v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 4th at 457.
84. Id at 459.
85. Id.
86. Id at 461.
87. Id at 463.
88. Id
89. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
No. 2] 473
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holding in a 5-4 decision, finding that California unconscionability law was
preempted by the FAA.90 The plaintiffs in that case brought a class action com-
plaint against AT&T, alleging that AT&T had engaged in false advertising and
fraud by charging customers sales tax on phones advertised by the company to be
free. 91 AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration as provided for in its con-
sumer contract, but the Concepcions opposed the motion, alleging that the arbitra-
tion agreement was "unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California
law because it disallowed classwide procedures."92 The Court noted that the
"principal purpose of the FAA is to 'ensur[e] that private arbitration agreements
are enforced according to their terms."' 93 Through the Court's construction of its
FAA analysis, it concluded that the rule set forth in Discover Bank interfered with
contractual arbitration rights by allowing any party to a consumer adhesion con-
tract to demand class-wide arbitration after the fact. 94 The Court concluded that in
passing the FAA, Congress had sought to achieve objectives that would be impos-
sible under the Discover Bank rule. As such, the Court held that the FAA
preempted the Discover Bank rule.95
D. California Law After Concepcion
California courts are currently struggling to determine if the express overrul-
ing of Discover Bank resulted in an implicit overruling of Gentry. While many
California lower courts have altogether avoided discussion of Gentry after Con-
cepcion, the Second District Court of Appeals in California entertained an argu-
ment that Gentry could have survived Concepcion.
In Kinecta Alternative Financial Solutions, Inc. v. Superior Court9 6 , the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals suggested that Gentry and Discover Bank created two
different tests to determine when a class arbitration waiver should be enforced,
meaning that the two decisions should be considered separately. 97 The court noted
that Discover Bank applied specifically to unconscionability of class action waiv-
ers in adhesion contracts, whereas Gentry discussed the effect of a class action
waiver on employees' de facto rights, which does not rely on any presence of
unconscionability. 98 In Kinecta, a plaintiff filed a class action complaint for dam-
ages, injunctive relief, and restitution against her employer, alleging that it had
violated California's wage and hour laws. 99 While the court briefly discussed the
possibility that Gentry survived the overruling of Discover Bank, it ultimately
found that the plaintiff had not met her burden of production of evidence, because
she did not establish the existence of the four Gentry factors. 00 However, the
90. Id. at 1753.
91. Id. at 1744.
92. Id. at 1744-1745.
93. Id. at 1748 (citing Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468,478 (1989)).
94. Id. at 1750.
95. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753.
96. Kinecta Alt. Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 250 Cal. App. 4th 506 (2012).
97. Id. at 516.
98. Id
99. Id. at 511.
100. Id. at 517.
474 [Vol. 2013
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court did note that since Gentry has not been expressly abrogated or overruled, it
was still binding law in California. 01
E. Iskanian and Franco: Cases Also Pending Review
Although numerous cases have questioned the continuing vitality of Gentry
after the overruling of Discover Bank, the forthcoming review of Iskanian v. CLS
Transp. Los Angeles, LLC102 by the Supreme Court of California may put an end
to the confusion in California. In the original case, an employee brought a class
action lawsuit against his employer, CLS, for failure to pay overtime, provide
meals and rest breaks, reimburse employees for business expenses, provide accu-
rate and complete wage statements and to pay final wages in a timely manner.'0 3
While Iskanian was employed by CLS, he signed an arbitration agreement that
contained an express waiver of class arbitration.'0 The California appellate court
found that the Concepcion decision conclusively invalidated the Gentry test be-
cause the Gentry test was founded on a mere policy rationale and could not
preempt the FAA. 0 5
After Iskanian filed his opening brief, the NLRB issued a decision interpret-
ing the application of the FAA to future employment disputes, after Concep-
cion.'0 6 The NLRB found that a mandatory, employer-imposed arbitration agree-
ment that requires all employment-related issues to be handled through bilateral
arbitration violates Section 7 of the (NLRA, because it prohibits collective bar-
gaining, a substantive employee right guaranteed by the NLRA.107 However, the
Iskanian court refused to give the NLRB's finding deference because its decision
went beyond a discussion of the NLRB and involved an analysis of Concepcion,
and other FAA-related authority.08 The court reasoned that since the NLRB's
analysis was overly-expansive in scope and because Concepcion created no ex-
ception for employment-related disputes, the court owed its findings no defer-
ence.109 However, on September 19, 2012, The Supreme Court of California
granted a review of the original Iskanian decision."r0 According to the filings for
the case on review, the Court will have to finally address whether Concepcion
overruled Gentry."'
In addition to the Reyes case, another case, Franko v. Arkelian Enterprises,
Inc.,"l2 has also been granted review, pending the outcome of the Iskanian case."3
Unlike in Iskanian, the California Court of Appeals found that the employee,
101. Id. at 516.
102. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 286 P.3d 147 (Cal. 2012).
103. Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372, 376 (2012), reh 'g denied (June 26,
2012), review granted and opinion superseded, Iskanian, 286 P.3d 147 (Cal. 2012).
104. Iskanian, 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 375.
105. Id. at 379-380.
106. Id. at 381.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 381-382.
109. Id. at 382.
110. Iskanian, 286 P.3d 147.
111. Opening Brief of Appellant, Iskanian v. CLS Trans. of L.A., 142 Cal. Rptr. 3d 372 (2012) (No.
S204032), 2012 WL 6762727.
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Franko, lacked the means to pursue individual relief from violations of his unwai-
vable statutory rights, and that he would, therefore, not have been able to bring his
case unless it was a class action suit."l 4 The Franco court found that certain parts
of the Gentry opinion were still valid and were not in complete conflict with the
FAA.' 15 The court rationalized that the plaintiff would have likely been unable to
find an attorney to adequately represent him in a bilateral arbitration considering
the modest size of the potential damage recovery." 6 The court further found that
enforcing class action waivers in similar situations would not force the employer
to correct its illegal behavior." 7
After exploring the meaning behind these statutory rights, the effects of the
United States Supreme Court's holdings in favor of enforcing agreements as writ-
ten, and the California case law that will attempt to reconcile all of these forces, it
becomes easier to contextualize the issue the Supreme Court of California will
seek to solve when it reviews the Iskanian decision. The remaining portions of
this paper will analyze the current state of the Reyes decision, and will apply past
decisions and analytical framework to predict the future of class action waivers in
the employment law context, in California.
IV. THE INSTANT DECISION
The California Court of Appeals first decided Reyes in favor of upholding
LBI's arbitration agreement. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of California
granted Reyes's petition for review due to the case's similarity to Iskanian, for
which the California Supreme Court had already granted review." 9 The Court of
Appeals arrived at its decision in Reyes using a two-prong argument. First, the
court found that LBI did not waive its right to compel arbitration, and second, that
Reyes could not base his argument on NLRB's analysis of the FAA because the
NLRB's rationale was inapplicable to the case.120
Prong 1
The first prong of the court of appeal's analysis focused on LBI's right to ar-
bitrate class actions under its Agreement with Reyes, California law, and other
factors that indicated that the steps LBI took did not unduly prejudice Reyes's
case. 121 The court relied on its holding in Kinecta in finding that the Agreement
between Reyes and LBI did not authorize class arbitration, because the contractual
language covered only bilateral arbitration.122 That court held that an arbitration
114. Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 571 (2012), as modified (Dec. 4, 2012),
review granted and opinion superseded, 294 P.3d 74 (Cal. 2013).
115. Franco, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561-563, 568.
116. Id. at 570.
117. Id. at 571.
118. Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 635 (2012).
119. Reyes v. Liberman Broad., 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. 2012).
120. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 634- 635.
121. Id. at 620-633. Other factors discussed include the fact that LBI had not delayed for too long of
a period of time before seeking stay, LBI did not file a counterclaim before seeking a stay, and Reyes
had not shown he was prejudiced by the delay. Id.
122. Id. at 622.
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agreement that contained no express waiver of class arbitration and made no ref-
erence to third parties was limited to disputes between the plaintiff and defend-
ant. 123
However, the Court of Appeals in Reyes went on to find that LBI could not
have successfully moved to compel arbitration when the controversy first arose.124
LBI originally would not have been able to successfully compel arbitration under
the Agreement under the California precedent. However, this changed after the
United States Supreme Court's decision in AT&T v. Concepcion.125 Therefore,
the court found that LBI did not act inconsistently with intent to arbitrate by mov-
ing to compel arbitration only after Concepcion was decided.126 Since Concep-
cion changed unconscionability law in California, the court found that LBI's deci-
sion to wait to move to compel arbitration until after that decision did not consti-
tute a waiver of its right to arbitrate.' 27 This was because Concepcion was the first
ruling that made it possible for LBI to enforce the Agreement as it was written.128
The court reasoned that Reyes's argument that Concepcion did not create an en-
tirely new law but merely increased LBI's likelihood of success in enforcing the
Agreement failed to recognize the futility doctrine 2 9 did not require "entirely
clear, uncontradicted authority barring the enforcement of the arbitration agree-
ment."130
The Court of Appeals next considered the factors that traditionally demon-
strate waiver of an arbitration agreement. The court reasoned that the "litigation
machinery" had not been "sufficiently invoked" before LBI notified Reyes of its
intent to arbitrate.' 31 The court noted that to find otherwise would require a record
of substantial litigation and found that in this case the parties had made "only
limited use of the judicial process."' 32 The court then found that although LBI had
waited thirteen months to move to compel arbitration, LBI had notified Reyes of
its intent to enforce the Agreement one month after the Concepcion decision was
123. Id. at 621-622.
124. Id. at 627.
125. Id.
126. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 627.
127. Id. at 627-628. The court cited the Fisher case where
defendant moved to compel arbitration over three years after the filing of the suit, did not raise
arbitration as an affirmative defense, filed pretrial motions, and engaged in extensive discovery.
Defendant moved to compel only after the Supreme Court rejected the 'intertwining doctrine' . . .
The court reasoned that the defendant 'properly perceived that it was futile to file a motion to
compel arbitration until' the Supreme Court rejected the intertwining doctrine. The court thus
held that defendants did not act 'inconsistently with a known existing right to compel arbitration.
Id. at 626 (quoting Fisher v. A.G. Becker Paribas Inc, 791 F.2d 691, 691-697 (9th Cir. 1986)).
128. Id. at 629-630. "LBI could not enforce the Arbitration Agreement as written prior to Concep-
cion." Id.
129. The futility doctrine is applied here to recognize that LBI would not have won their motion to
compel arbitration prior to the Concepcion ruling and filing a motion to compel arbitration before the
Concepcion decision would have been futile, or pointless because the court would have dismissed the
motion under Gentry. Id. at 626-627.
130. Id. at 628.
131. Id at 629.
132. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 629. The court determined that although the parties had engaged in
meet and confer efforts for thirteen months, no discovery had actually been exchanged. Id.
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handed down, and therefore the delay was justified and did not constitute a waiv-
er.133
The court considered whether Reyes was prejudiced by LBI's delay in mov-
ing to compel arbitration, but it ultimately found that Reyes had failed to prove
that he suffered prejudice sufficient to bar enforcement of the Agreement. 13 4 The
record failed to indicate any other conduct by LBI that constituted potential preju-
dice to Reyes.' 3 5 The court noted that, in the context of class arbitration, mere
evidence of delay was not sufficient evidence of prejudice.136 The court rejected
Reyes's argument that he was prejudiced by LBI's "egregious delay" because
LBI's explanation for its delay proved to be reasonable and LBI gave Reyes time-
ly notification of its intention to compel arbitration under the circumstances. 137 In
light of these facts, the court viewed the delay as more comparable to a one-month
delay than to a thirteen month delay.1 38 The court held in favor of LBI's right to
compel individual arbitration of Reyes's wage and hour claims.139
Prong 2
In the second prong of its analysis, the court of appeals rejected Reyes's ar-
gument that an order requiring individual arbitration would deprive him of his
right to participate in NLRA-protected collective legal action. The court fol-
lowed the reasoning of the Iskanian case and rejected the NLRB's authority in
interpreting the FAA.141 The court followed the recent trend of California courts
of enforcing agreements to arbitrate according to their terms unless the FAA's
mandate was overridden by a Congressional provision.142
133. Id. at 631. LBI filed its motion to compel arbitration on July 5, 2011. Reyes's motion for class
certification was not set to be heard until October 17, 20111. The court held this was "far from waiting
until the eve of trial to move for arbitration." Id.
134. Id. at 362.
135. Id. "[T]here is no evidence that LBI used the judicial discovery process to gain information
which it would not otherwise be able to obtain." LBI participated in the limited discovery under belief
that it had no meaningful alternative because the Arbitration Agreement was unenforceable as written.
Id. at 631.
136. Id. at 630.
137. Id at 631-632.
138. Reyes, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 632.
Even if delay alone may constitute prejudice in the individual arbitration context, that is not nec-
essarily true in the class arbitration context, as class arbitration does not convey the same ad-
vantages as individual arbitration. Here, Reyes was not prejudiced by the 13-month delay alone
because for 12 months, LBI could not invoke arbitration without being forced into class arbitra-
tion.
Id.
139. Id. at 633.
140. Id. "Section 7 of the NLRA 'provides in relevant part that employees shall have the right to
engage in . . . concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or pro-
tection."' Id. at 634 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 157).
141. Id "Iskanian rejected this reasoning, finding the NLRB's analysis of the FAA unavailing. As the
'FAA is not a statute the NLRB is charged with interpreting."' Id.
142. Id. at 634-635.
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Petition for Review Granted
The petition for review granted by the Supreme Court of California directly
concerns class action waivers in the employment law context, which will be re-
viewed in Iskanian.14 3 Once the Court determines the standards for enforceability
of a class action waiver in an employment contract, and the applicable case law
that California courts should apply, a final decision can be rendered in Reyes.144
V. COMMENT
It is important to review the reasoning of the prior California state court deci-
sions in order to determine how the Supreme Court of California will decide Is-
kanian, and therefore, the Franco and Reyes cases. This section will propose a
rule for class arbitration waivers in the employment law context, which the Su-
preme Court of California could adopt as an exception to the regime of FAA
preemption established by the United States Supreme Court in AT&T v. Concep-
cion.
An exception to the rule of FAA preemption, which would disallow class ar-
bitration waivers in the employment law context, should be adopted because class
arbitration of employment disputes is a crucial tool that employees must be able to
use in order to exercise their statutory rights.' 45 However, as this section will
discuss, the Supreme Court of California may choose not to differentiate employ-
ment contracts from other types of contracts, and apply the Concepcion rule. The
Concepcion rule creates a blanket presumption that contracts signed by both par-
ties are enforceable as written. 146 Lastly, this section will discuss how a decision
by the Supreme Court of California to reaffirm the validity of the Gentry test in
California could affect the outcome of Reyes, and future California employment
contract cases.
In reviewing the Iskanian case, the Supreme Court of California will render a
decision that will affect both the Franco and Reyes cases. The lower courts in all
three of these cases applied the FAA and California law differently, with respect
to class arbitration waivers in the employment context. When the Supreme Court
of California reviews the Iskanian decision, it will have a choice as to how it will
review the issue. It could follow the lead of the lower courts in Iskanian and ac-
cept Concepcion as a broad rule without exceptions. Conversely, the Court could
apply the Franco standards, and evaluate employment contracts in light of the
employees' unwaivable de facto rights. This approach would allow the court to
hold that the Gentry test is valid, and outside the scope of the Concepcion ruling.
143. Reyes v. Liberman Broad., 288 P.3d 1287 (Cal. 2012).
144. Id.
145. In re D.R. Horton, Inc., 357 NLRB No. 184, 2012 WL 12-CA-25764 (N.L.R.B. Jan. 3, 2012).
146. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748 (2011).
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A. Argument that Gentry Survived Stolt-Nielsen and is Untouched
by Concepcion
There is much debate in California courts as to whether the Gentry decision
survived the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Concepcion. Both Stolt-
Nielsen and Concepcion created strong federal presumptions that arbitration
agreements would be enforced according to the arbitration agreement's terms.
Stolt-Nielsen stated that a party could not be compelled to participate in class arbi-
tration when the arbitration agreement was silent on the question of class-wide
arbitration,147 whereas Concepcion held that the FAA prohibits states from condi-
tioning the conscionability of certain arbitration agreements on the existence of
class-wide arbitration procedures.148 As a result of these Supreme Court decisions,
federal courts have created a very pro-employer atmosphere, over-turning class
action waivers.
While it is important to focus on what Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion dis-
cussed, it is arguably just as important to examine what those cases did not dis-
cuss. Neither case discussed contracts of adhesion in the employment context.
Further, neither case discussed how to apply the FAA when a class arbitration
waiver could waive an employee's rights to effectively seek a remedy for his or
her claim. Neither the U.S. Supreme Court nor the Supreme Court of California
has resolved the apparent conflict between the FAA standard of enforceability and
an employee's right to act in concert, as guaranteed under the NLRA.149 California
state court cases have struggled to determine how far reaching the U.S. Supreme
Court decisions are and whether there is any room for a state court to determine
exceptional cases without violating the FAA.
Some California state courts have identified possible loopholes in the United
States Supreme Court decisions that would allow Gentry to survive Concepcion.
Although the Kinecta court declined to formally render a decision as to the Gentry
issue, the court contended that Gentry was still binding law in California state
courts.15 0 The Kinecta court's decision supports the argument that Gentry is still
applicable in cases where a class action waiver would impair employees' de facto
rights, and where a class action would provide employees with the most practical
and effective means of vindicating these rights.' 5'
In Franco, the court advanced the notion expressed by the Kinecta court, that
Gentry was not truly rooted in Discover Bank. Rather, the court explained that a
plaintiff could not be compelled to arbitrate issues of unwaivable rights under
circumstances where individual arbitration would render inadequate results.152
147. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 670 (2010).
148. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. at 1749-1750.
149. Carolyn Kokler, 9th Circuit Arbitration Ruling Could Impact Employment Cases, Thomson
Reuters News & Insight (Apr. 12, 2013) available at
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2013/04_-
April/9th Circuit arbitration rulingcould impact employment cases/.
150. Kinecta Alt. Fin. Solutions, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 250 Cal. App. 4th 506, 516 (2012).
151. Id. (citing Arguelles-Romero v. Super. Ct., 184 Cal. App. 4th 825, 836-837 (2010)).
152. Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 560-61 (2012). The court argued this
case involves unwaivable employee rights and therefore more closely resembles Armendariz v. Found.
Health Psychcare Services, Inc. There, the court held that an arbitration agreement could not serve as a
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The Franco court found that in some instances, Discover Bank and Gentry were
applications of the same general principle, even though the cases were largely
based on different legal theories.'53 The Franco court stated that since Discover
Bank was based on a finding of unconscionability, it was subject to de novo re-
view.154 On the contrary, a finding under Gentry is based on whether a class ac-
tion would allow a better means for vindicating certain unwaivable statutory rights
and was thus subject to discretionary determination subject to abuse of discretion
review.' 55 Further, the Franco court found that, even though, under Stolt-Nielsen,
a plaintiff relying on Gentry could not compel class arbitration if he had not con-
tracted for this right, a plaintiff may still be able to able to adjudicate his case as a
class action. 156
Although Discover Bank seems to broadly uphold arbitration agreements un-
der the FAA, it cannot be ignored that the case dealt with consumer contracts and,
as a class of people, consumers do not have the same unwaivable rights that em-
ployees enjoy. While Discover Bank focused on the intentional bad behavior of
the companies enforcing the contracts and the relatively small amount of damages,
those are only two of the factors considered under the Gentry framework. 157 The
remaining two factors deal directly with employees' substantive right to seek col-
lective relief in accordance with the NLRA.' 58 Applying the reasoning of In re
American Exp., one can see that the reasoning supporting Gentry is completely
different from that found in Concepcion and Discover Bank. A Gentry claim rests
on the combination of a federal statutory right and an inability to vindicate that
right individually due to economic constraints.'59 Adherence to the Gentry test
will likely not be found to conflict with the FAA because the test is narrow, focus-
es on substantive rights, and is only triggered under this specific combination of
circumstances.
Therefore, in reviewing the Iskanian, Reyes and Franco cases, the Supreme
Court of California could find that class arbitration waivers in employment con-
tracts are subject to a different standard of review than class arbitration waivers in
other contracts, because employees have statutorily protected rights not afforded
to other classes of people, such as consumers. Further, a finding that a class arbi-
tration waiver conflicts with an employee's ability to vindicate his or her protected
rights is not comparable to a finding of unconscionability under California state
law.'1 The remedy for these employment violations will be to allow the employ-
ees override the arbitration provision, certify a class, and bring their claim in
court. This is not to say that all class arbitration waivers would become unen-
forceable in the employment context. However, it seems the issue of enforceabil-
ity of a waiver will depend on the conduct of the employers and whether they use
a class arbitration waiver as a sword to violate their employees' rights.
vehicle for the waiver of certain statutory rights created by the California Fair Employment and Hous-
ing Act. Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 83, 101 (2000).
153. Franco, 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 561.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 533.
157. JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 2:14 (9th ed. 2012).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. This was the issue in Discover Bank v. Super. Ct., 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 76, 87 (2005).
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B. Other Factors May Influence the Supreme Court of
California's Decision
Based on the complicated legal landscape surrounding class arbitration waiv-
ers, it is easy to see how the Supreme Court of California could render a decision
that is influenced by many factors. California was essentially publicly reprimand-
ed in the Concepcion opinion for creating in the Discover Bank rule, in violation
of the FAA. The United States Supreme Court specifically took issue with Cali-
fornia's bypassing of the FAA on public policy grounds.
The Supreme Court of California seems reluctant to render a decision con-
firming or overruling Gentry. Three cases have accumulated as part of the Is-
kanian review. Additionally, even though lower courts in California sometimes
discuss Gentry, the overwhelming majority of these courts have found the case
inapplicable in almost every situation. This suggests that California courts are
reluctant to resolve this issue and this procrastination has resulted in confusion.
The Iskanian case will likely be decided on two issues. First, the court will
need to determine if an employee's right to bring a collective employment-related
claim is a statutory right protected by Section 7 of the NLRA. If the court deter-
mines that employees have a statutory right to bring a class claim, then it will have
to determine if a class action waiver violates this right. It is very likely that the
Supreme Court of California will not challenge the United States Supreme Court's
mandated application of the FAA again, unless the Court is satisfied that a strong-
er argument in favor of an exception exists.
However, the extent to which courts feel compelled to favor preemption by
the FAA is unclear. It is important to note that Concepcion was only a 5-4 deci-
sion.161 Further, Justice Thomas's concurrence noted that he reluctantly joined the
majority opinion because he was in favor of a more uniform rule that what was
being enforced at the time. 162 However, plenty of uniform rules carry exceptions.
C. A Finding Upholding Gentry Could Be a Win for
Employees Everywhere
In Reyes, the court of appeals found that the plaintiff's initial claim was not a
solid Gentry claim.'6 3 However, that does not mean that the plaintiff in Reyes
could not potentially benefit from an opinion by the Supreme Court of California
validating the Gentry test. Since Concepcion, California courts have been reluc-
tant to find that a plaintiff has established a case under Gentry.'6 After Concep-
cion, it appears that lower courts in California have lacked uniformity in determin-
ing how much evidence is required to meet the Gentry test. The Second Circuit
application of an FAA presumption, as articulated in In re American Express,
focused on the combination of a statutory right and an economic incapability to
161. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157.
162. Id.
163. Reyes v. Liberman Broad., Inc., 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 616, 625 (2012).
164. Reyes and Kinecta found that the plaintiff failed to meet the burden under Gentry. The only
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bring an individual claim.165 These issues are at the heart of the Gentry factors.
The Supreme Court of California could arguably establish a California presump-
tion disfavoring class arbitration waivers for wage and hours disputes. Such an
exception could be based on a finding that most individual employees would lack
the means to effectively arbitrate their rights because the potential damages are
likely low and employees have a statutory right to pursue class relief under the
NLRA.166
A liberal construction of the Gentry test, which focuses on the combination of
the existence of a statutory right and economic hardship that prevents the vindica-
tion of that right, could render Gentry directly applicable to Reyes. Reyes would
first have the burden of demonstrating that a class arbitration waiver violated his
rights as an employee under the NLRA. Then, Reyes would have to prove that
vindicating his rights individually would cause him sufficient hardship. This
would not be very difficult in many wage and hour disputes, since they tend to be
relatively small.
While the court of appeals in Reyes said that Gentry was inapplicable to the
case, there is some doubt as to whether that statement is correct. California courts
have been hesitant to apply the Gentry test since Concepcion, which has caused
much confusion regarding how the test should be used. The Supreme Court of
California has the opportunity to create a legal environment that recognizes an
employee's statutory right to collective bargaining under the NLRA, and to create
an exception for these cases under the FAA. A similar exception has been created
by the Second Circuit, and such an exception would greatly benefit employees
like Reyes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of California has a difficult decision ahead in determining
the applicability of the FAA to class arbitration waivers in the employment law
context in California. An argument could be made that, in some instances, collec-
tive bargaining is essential to the preservation of employees' unwaivable de facto
rights, and that individual arbitration is insufficient to vindicate these rights. If the
Supreme Court of California affirms Gentry, the court must clarify its application.
Gentry would be most beneficial to Mr. Reyes if the court's review of Iskanian
finds that there is a presumption of a de facto waiver of an employee's statutory
rights in a wage and hour claim based on an employer's behavior that has affected
a class of employees.
JOANNA L. BYRNE
165. MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 157. See generally, In re American Express Merchants' Litig., 634
F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2011), stating that:
Class action lawsuits are well-recognized by the Supreme Court as a vehicle for vindicating
statutory rights. This is especially true with respect to the Court's recognition that the class action
device is the only economically rational alternative when a large group of individuals or entities
has suffered an alleged wrong, but the damages due to any single individual or entity are too
small to justify bringing an individual action.
Id. at 194.
166. Franco v. Arakelian Enters., Inc., 149 Cal. Rptr. 3d 530, 560-61 (2012).
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